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ABSTRACT
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) was dangerous and can cause
humongous loss for the process plant. Reid (1976) defined BLEVEs as the sudden loss of
containment of a liquid that is at a superheated temperature for atmospheric conditions.
There are a lot of commercialized tools in estimating the effects of BLEVE but very
complicated and not user friendly. Development of model from Microsoft Excel in
estimating the BLEVE effects was a main objective inthis project.
In this project, a process in MLNG Malaysia was utilized as one of the case study.
Stabilizer C-2502 was utilized as case study in this project. The feed to Stabilizer- 2502,
consist of the bottomform the Demethanizer and any propane, which is being re-processed
from the liquefaction unit. In this project, HYSYS simulator acted as "live"
thermodynamic database tobeextracted toMicrosoft Excel for effect estimation.
The first effect is overpressure or blast effect. In thiscase study the maximum overpressure
due to distance is 0.87 psi which the damage is partial demolition of houses. The second
effect is thermal radiation. The result that obtained is in term radiation dose. The maximum
radiation dose is 721.171 kJ/m2. Thiswill cause third -degree burns (99%fatal).
In this Final Year Project, the result from this BLEVE model is compared to the result
from SAFETI Software. The SAFETI Software has being established for many years and
well known in the process industries. This is to validate the result the obtained from
BLEVE model.
The main objectives were accomplished. The desired data from HYSYS is extracted to ME
interface to performs the calculation and effect estimation. Further development of this
project is commercially advisable.
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1.1 Background of study
Safety and loss prevention is an important aspect in plant design processes. Design and
operating companies spend large amount of money and expertise to ensure safety is
included from the beginning of design right up to operations. In design stage, risk
assessments are carried out for internal design uses as well as to oblige by government
regulations. Some authorities such as United State Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) commit companies to perform risk assessment basedon worst -case scenarios.
In Malaysia, chemical and petrochemical industries are required to perform risk
assessment as part of the project approval process (Environmental Quality Act 1974). All
the process owners are also required to submit risk and consequence assessment to
Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) (Control of Industrial Major
Accidents and Hazards (CIMAH) Regulation 1996 Schedule 6).
A reliability and safety assessment method is very important in the process industries.
The objectives are to improve the safety and availability of new and existing plant. The
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is to estimate the potential risk level of the plant
design and it was done at the end of the design stage. With the new approach, the QRA
can be done simultaneous in the design stage.
1.2 Problem statement
The risk assessment analysis or the QRA of process plant is done when the process
design stage is almost completed. The process designeris often lack of informationabout
risk levels and consequence that may result in diversion of their process condition. One
of the consequences is Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) that could
occur if enough ignition source available near to the process equipment. Therefore, it is
vital to estimate the risk created from BLEVE during design stage, as this will promote
the development of inherently safer plant at earlier stage.















Figure 1.1:Causalities of incidents in Malaysia at year 1999
BLEVE have increased in number due to an increase in inventories of flammable
materials in chemical process plant and operation at more severe conditions. Any process
containing quantities of liquefied gases, volatile superheated liquid, or high- pressure and
temperature gases is considered good candidates for a BLEVE.
The model is important for process designer to study on the risk assessment analysis of
process inplant. All the data, calculation, discussion and simulation inthis project will be
used as a parameter for process designer to simulate the possibility of BLEVE to happen
and its effects in the plant. Besides that, the data and the result obtained from the BLEVE
model will be used to compare with the data obtained from other BLEVE tools/
simulator.
Typical risk assessment software such as BLEVE incident simulator (BIS), Atmospheric
Dispersion of Reactive Agent (ADORA) has been specifically designed with the safety
processing, safety analysis, and safety control. However these softwares are too general
in terms of estimating the BLEVE effects in the process plant. These softwares also are
too complicated with their interface and only for advanced users.
Process simulator like HYSYS is widely used in process design. This simulator is bale to
provide designers the optimized condition of the process, reflect any changes in
conditions immediately. Advanced features can help process owners calculate the process
economics. This simulator is useful in determining which route to choose and develop. In
later stage, they can be used as training tool. However, current process simulator is not
equipped with tool to determined risk and effects related to the major equipments.
Development of such tool would allow inherent safety features be incorporated into
design.
1.3 Objectives
The main objective of the project is to create a tool/simulator to estimate the risk created
from BLEVE during design stage. There also some other objectives that needs to be
achieved through this project; there are:-
a. To develop BLEVE models in Microsoft Excel Application
b. To test the models with established data for BLEVE risk
c. To apply the models in LNG plant as case study in HYSYS to validate the
tool.
1.4 Scope of study
Inorder toachieve the objectives, the scopes have been defined and used as guidelines.
There are many major hazards in the chemical process industries, like fire, explosion,
toxic release and vapor cloud explosion. The research focused on Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) as this hazard causes the second largest amount of
monetary losses and resulted inhighest number ofcasualties.
There are many methods available to estimate risk due to explosion. In this research, the
TNT Equivalent Method is used. These equations and correlations are widely used in
commercially available software and widely acceptable by industries and government
agencies.
A failure ofeither equipment or operational standards could, in some cases, result in an
explosion which could take one or many forms. For example the explosive failure of
pressure vessel due to over pressurization or avapor cloud explosion (VCE) following an
ignited release of flammable gases. The research focused on studying the effect of
external fire exposure (i.e, pool fire under the vessel) that will cause BLEVE effects.
The BLEVE tool/simulator would be applied in the real case study such as in LNG plant.
Microsoft EXCEL is used asdevelopment platform for the risk estimation tool. This case
study was simulated by using process simulator, HYSYS. In this project, HYSYS
simulator acted as "live" thermodynamic database. Based onthe case study (steady state)
simulation, the needed composition and properties of the process can be obtained and
then extracted to Microsoft Excel for effect estimation.
This project will go deeply in the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)
effects. Some of the effects will be studied such as the thermal radiation, the missile
projectile and estimation of overpressure. Generally, all these effects will be discussed
further in literature review section. To simplify the study scope, this project is expected to




Inherent means "built-in". Safety feature is an important feature in everyday life
including chemical process industries. Inherent safety can thus be defined as safety
features that are built-in to a process from early design stages and through out its life
cycle.
Inherent safety has become and important aspect and is deemed as the best method to
design a plant safe for operation with no harm to the environment, health and also
equipments. Traditionally, safety features are more of "reactive" countermeasure rather
than a "proactive" means to prevent accident. Inherent safety approach is also the
opposite of Traditional Safety approach (also known as Extrinsic Safety). The Traditional
Safety approach aims to reduce risk ofa process by adding protective barriers to control
hazards. Inherent Safety on the other hand aims to reduce or eliminate the hazards by
modifying the design of the plant itself. Inherent Safety is a proactive approach for
hazard orrisk management during process plant design and operation.
Inherent Safety sometimes referred to as "primary prevention" is an approach to chemical
accidents that is opposite of "secondary accident prevention" and mitigation. Inherent
Safety is helpful also for pollution prevention. This approach to safety is based on the use
oftechnologies and chemicals that reduce or eliminate the possibility ofan accident.
On the other hand, Traditional Safety relies on the reduction and migration of the
consequences of an accident. This last approach alone is unable to avoid or reduce the
risk of serious accident (Zwetsloot G. and Askounes-Ashford, 1999).
While Traditional Safety approach can be very efficient and useful, it presents some
disadvantages too. The initial cost of building a plant could be lower, compared with
inherent safer options, however the installation of safety barriers represent additional
expenses.
The barriers themselves require expensive maintenance (Lutz, W.K, 1997) and they can
suffer partial or complete dangerous failures (undetected failure). Since the original
hazards are still present, accidents can occurs and their consequences could be worse by
generous -failure mode of the barrier. Because the social, environmental and economical
cost derived from every accident is not taken in the short term economical analysis of a
process, the initial lowercost of the plant is usuallyuntrue.
Principles defining Inherent Safety were formalized by Trevor Kletz (1991) and
summarized below:
a. Intensification - Reduction of the inventoried ofhazardous materials.
b. Substitution - Change or hazardous chemicals substances are less hazardous
chemicals.
c. Attenuation - Reduction of the volumes of hazardous materials required in the
process. Reduction of operation hazards by changing the processing conditions to
lower temperature, pressure or flows.
d. Limitation of Effects - The facilities must be designed in order to minimize
effects of the hazardous chemicals or energies releases.
e. Simplification - Avoidance of complexities such as multi-product or multi-unit
operations, or congested pipe or unit settings.
f. Error Tolerance - Making equipment robust, processes that can bear upsets,
reactors able to withstand unwanted reactions, ect.
In this research, the attenuation principle is used, where we try to reduce the operation
hazards by changing the processing conditions to lower temperature. It is because in
BLEVE, the process temperature is critical.
2.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Many tools are available for Hazardsand Effects Management Process (HEMP)to assess
and control on industrial risk. These tools are not mutually exclusive and each ofthe tools
has its advantages and appropriate applications. Among the HEMP tools, Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) is a powerful decision making tool which can assist in the
selection of acceptable solutions to safety problems. This technique can be defined as the
formal and systematic approach to identifying hazards, potentially hazardous events and
estimating likelihood and consequences to people, environment and assets, of incidents
developing form these events ( Shell International Exploration,1995). Thetotal process of
risk analysis interpretation of results and recommendations of corrective actions is
usually called "Risk Assessment".
Over last decade, QRA has gained a wide acceptance as powerful tool to identify and
assess the significant sources of risk and evaluate alternative risk control measures in
chemical process industries. QRA is also considered a valuable tool indecision making
process, to communicate among the expert involved, to quantify options and to combine
these effectively with available statistical data. A properly preformed risk analysis
documents the best knowledge of the company's technical experts. Application of QRA
has contributed not only to increased safety but also improved cost effectiveness in many
areas.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) should only be used with proper intentions. Like
anytool misuse of QRAcanbringaboutundesirable incidents. QRAshould be used:
a. To reduce risk rather than to prove acceptability
b. To minimize risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) is required.
c. To represent reality ratherthan force fitting into a rigidmodel.
d. To compare like to like
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QuantitativeRisk Assessment (QRA) will only be successfully carried out if:
a. QRA specialists work and communicates with others in the project
b. Proper data handling is observed i.e. selecting and suing the most reliable and
applicable data.
c. Appropriate level ofdetail is used
2.3 Major Hazards in Chemical Process Industries
In Chemical Process Industries (CPI), safety plays a very important role in ensuring that
there will be no damage to the environment and the process plants pose no danger to the
people working in the plant. Major hazards include release of hazardous materials, fire
and explosion.
Major accidents in chemical industry have occurred worldwide. Increasing
industrialization after the Second World War also led to a significant increase of
accidents involving dangerous substances. In Europe, in the 1970's two major accidents
in particular prompted the adoption of legislation aimed at the prevention and control of
such accidents.
The Flixborough accident in the United Kingdom in 1974 was a particularly spectacular
example. A huge explosion and fire resulted in 28 fatalities, personal injury bothon and
off-side. It also had a domino effect on other industrial activity in the area, causing the
lossof coolant at nearby steelworks, which couldhave led to a further serious accident.
The Seveso accident happened in 1976 at a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides and
herbicides. A dense vapor cloud containing tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxm (TCDD) was
released from a reactor, used for the production of trichlorofenol. Commonly known as
dioxin, this was a poisonous and carcinogenic by-product of an uncontrolled exothermic
reaction. More than 600 people had to be evacuated from their homes and as many as
2000 were treated for dioxin poisoning.
Another notable accident was at the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India (1984) where
a leak of methyl isocyanate caused more than 2500 fatalities.
2.4 Explosion
Explosion behavior depends on a large number of parameters. Those parameters are
ambient temperature, ambient pressure, composition of explosive material, physical
properties of explosive material, nature of ignition source , amount of combustible
material and rate at which combustible is released (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990).
Explosion are either detonations or deflagrations, the differences depends on the speed of
shock wave emanating form the explosion. Both detonation and deflagrations can be
illustrated by using a long pipe which a combustible mixture is placed as Figure 2.1
below (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990).
Qos«s
Source: Joseph F. Louvar, 1990
Figure 2.1: Reactionand pressurefronts propagating through a pipe
A small spark, flame or other ignition source initiates the reaction at one end of the pipe.
After ignition, a flame or reaction moves down the pipe. In front of the flame front is a
pressureor shock wave as shown in Figure 2.1. If the pressurewave move faster than the
speed of sound in the un-reacted medium, the explosion is detonation, if it moves at a
speed of sound, it is a deflagration.
There are several mechanisms leadings to explosive detonation (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990).
The essential ingredient is that the energy must be released in very short time within a
very small volume to produce a significant initialpressure shock wave; two mechanisms
have been proposed to describe such an event. For the first mechanism is called the
thermal mechanism. The gas temperature increase by reaction, leading to self-
acceleration of the reaction rate. The second mechanism is called the chain branching
mechanism. Reactive free radicals are rapidly increased in numbers by elementary
reaction. Both of these mechanisms can account for explosive behavior. In reality both
are bound to occur.
A deflagration can alsoevolve into a detonation. This is particularly common in pipesbut
unlikely in vessel or open spaces. In a pipingsystem, energy from a deflagration can feed
forward to the pressure wave, resulting in an increase in the adiabatic pressure rise. The
pressure builds and results in a full detonation.
Explosion includes Vapor Cloud Explosion, Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
(BLEVE) and Mechanical Explosion. J&H Marsh and McLennan (1998) had shown that
explosion and vapor cloud explosion caused large losses in monetary terms. Figure 2.2
and 2.3 shows average million dollar loss in 100 large property damage losses in
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Figure 2.2: Average dollar loss to types ofmajor hazards in hydrocarbon industries, (J&H
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Figure 2.3: Frequency of event of 100 large property damage losses in hydrocarbon
processing industry from 1966 to 1996, (J&H Marsh and McLennan Consulting, 1998)
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Apart form causing large monetary losses, these incidents also caused large numbers of
casualties. Owing to its damaging blast waves, explosions caused the higher number of
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Figure 2.4: Causalities in incidents world wide (DOSHMalaysia, 2001)
2.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)
A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is a special type of accident that
can release large quantities of materials. If the materials are flammable a Vapor Cloud
Explosion (VCE) might result; if toxic, a large areamight be subjected to toxic materials.
For either situation, the energy release by the BLEVE process itself can result in
considerable damage.
Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions were defined by Walls (1979), one of those
who first proposed the acronym BLEVE, as a failure of a major container into two or
more pieces occurring at a moment when the container is at a temperature above its
boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure. Reid (1976) defined BLEVEs as the sudden
loss of containment of a liquid that is at a superheated temperature for atmospheric
conditions.
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More recently, less restrictive definitions have been proposed and are being accepted by
diverse authors; for example, (CCPS, 1994) an explosion resulting from the failure of a
vessel containing a liquid at a temperature significantly above its boiling point at normal
atmospheric pressure. To classify an accident as a BLEVE or not will depend on the
definition accepted.
The most common type ofBLEVE is caused byfire. The steps are as follows:-
a. A liquefied nature gas (LNG) leaks and it lit byfire.
b. The LNG tank isexposed to high temperature fire resulting tank weakening.
c. A crack is caused by the internal pressure; the internal pressure drops
abruptly; and
d. The tank ruptures with sudden depressurization and the violent of
superheated LNG
Ifthe liquid is flammable and a fire is the cause of the BLEVE, it may ignite as the tank
ruptures.
Often, the boiling and burning liquid behaves as a rocket fuel, propelling vessel parts for
great distance. Ifthe BLEVE is not caused by a fire, avapor cloud might form, resulting
in a VCE. When a BLEVE occurs in a vessel, only a fraction of the liquid vaporizes; the
amount depends on the physical and thermodynamic condition ofthe vessel contents.
2.6 Available Simulation Tools
Currently, in the engineering world there are a lot ofrisk assessment tool that able to
estimate theeffects of BLEVE. One of the models is BLEVE incident simulator (BIS)
software. It was developed by of Professor A. M. Birk, 1997. The second model is
Atmospheric Dispersion Of Reactive Agent (ADORA). This safety model was
developed by COTR Maj. Becky Wagner, 1998. It is the premier Environmental and
Safety offsite Consequence Analysis tool available for use by organizations involved
with environmental impact assessments for intentional or accidental discharge of
hazardous chemicals that react with air, fire oreach other. The third model isSoftware
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for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive, and Toxic Impact (SAFETI). This
model is a 32-bit software package used for risk assessment and developed by DNV
Software Risk Management Solution. SAFETI combines the consequences and
frequencies ofthe hazards todetermine the risk.
SAFETI uses built in (DIPPR) chemical and parameter data, along with scenario,
meteorological, population, and ignition data supplied by the user to predict the risk
form:
a. Designedatmospheric release
b. Accidental atmospheric release ofhazardous materials
These models are too general in term of estimating the BLEVE effects in the process
plant. In this tool/simulator, the estimation ofBLEVE effect is just aminor part.
Although there are many of the safety models commercialized, some of it is not user
friendly. In other words, this kind of model is too complicated with their interface and
only for advanced users. Some of it also did not cover all of the BLEVE effect such as
thermal radiation level, estimation ofoverpressure, and missile projectile.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Explosion is depends on a lot of parameters, which it can be either detonation or
deflagration. The effects of BLEVE are hazardous and ignorance of BLEVE can caused
great loss ofhuman life as well as the properties ofplant.
Current hazard analyzing tools are not equipped with combination of BLEVE effects
estimation and thefunction ofextracting data from process simulation tools like HYSYS.
Thesetools also is too complicated and not user friendly.
A lotof BLEVE affects estimation methods available nowadays. Nevertheless, all of the
tools are developed based on different scenarios ofBLEVE. Besides, those methods are






Figure 3.1 illustrated the case study ofthis project, which is cryogenic process of LNG
processing from establish plant. This case study is taken from previous FYP project to
show a continuation in the research. The previous research is done by Lau Wai Chong.
Stabilizer C-2502 was utilized as case study in this project. The feed to Stabilizer- 2502,
consist of the bottom form the Demethanizer and any propane," which is being re
processed from the liquefaction unit.
From HYSYS simulation, the vapor fraction feed Stabilizer, C-2502 is 0.3223. This
showed that Stabilizer, C-2502 is working under highly liquid and less vapor mixture.
The release offlammable liquid will create explosion, if the ambient temperature isabove
the BLEVE limit. Thus, any external exposure of fire at this vessel will, increase the
temperature above the BLEVE limit temperature of the compound. Hence, this vessel ill
be the best model to be used inthis project for calculating the explosion risk such as blast


























3.2 BLEVE Effects Estimation Method
3.2.1 BLEVE Limitation
There is a limitation for BLEVE to take place. According to Reid (1980), BLEVE
limitation can be estimated by using the superheat temperature limit, (Tsl). The
superheat temperature limit is the limit to which compound may be heated before
spontaneous nucleation occurs, giving avapor explosion. If the temperature at current
condition of the vessel is greater than the superheat temperature limit of the material,
the BLEVE will happen. The correlation between the superheat temperature limit with
critical temperature is as below, Reid (1980):
Tsi= 0.895 Tc (1)
The critical temperature value for each material that is used can be found in the Perry's
Chemical Engineering Handbook thermodynamic properties tables.
3.2.2 BLEVE Blast Effect
The blast wave associated with aBLEVE event is estimated by calculating the total
work done by superheated liquid as it expands from its initial condition at the time of
vessel failure to atmospheric condition. For storage vessels with properly sized relief
valves, it is assumed that the failure pressure of the vessel is 1.21 times the relief
valve set point (CCPS, AIChE, 1994).
This approach is recommended by the CCPS (1994). Assuming as isentropic
expansion, the total work (W) done by the superheated liquid during the expansion
process is given by the following:
W=-AU (2)
where AU is achange in internal energy of the expanding fluid.
17
The specific internal energy (u) at a specific state may be obtained directly from
thermodynamic tables, or it may be calculated if the specific enthalpy (h), pressure (p)
and specific volume (v) are known:
u = h-pv (3)
The change in internal energy (AU) is then estimatedfrom the following:
AU = mf,2uf,2 + mg!2Ugj2 - mf;iuf,i - mg?i %i (4)
where m^ and mg,i are the liquid and vapor masses, respectively , at state i, and Uf?i
and ug,i are the liquid and vapor -specific internal energies, respectively, at state i. The
mass of liquid and vapor at final state is estimated formthe following:
mf!2 = (1-Xf) mfji + (l-xg) m&i (5)
mg,2 = (xf) mf,i +( Xg) mg>i (6)
Xf= (Sf,l - Sf;2)/ (Sg,2 - Sf,2) (7)
Xg= (Sgji - Sf;2)/ (Sg,2 - sf,2) (8)
where Xf is a fraction of the initial liquid mass that flashed to vapor, xg is the fraction
of initial vapor mass that does not condense during the explosion, and Sf;i and sgj are
the liquid and vapor specific entropies, respectively at state i. if the entropy data are
not available, xf and xg can be estimated assuming an isenthalpic expansion, where
the entropies term in equation (7) and (8) is change to enthalpies terms.
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The total work done is converted to the mass of TNT. The equivalent energy of TNT
is 1120 cal/gm. The overpressure can be estimated using an equivalent mass of TNT
(m-TNT) and using the distance (r), from the ground zero point of the explosion. The
empirically derived scaling law is, (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990):
Ze = r/(mTNT) 1/3 (9)
Figure 3.1 provides the correlation in SI units: the overpressure is in kPa and the
scaling parameter, Ze, is in m/kg m. Damage estimates based on overpressure are















V3,Scaled Distance (m/kg )
Figure 3.2Correlation between overpressure andscaled distance SI units






















Large glass windows which are already under strain broken
I ftllfi nstie-A On«:_ U _•_ _ * .. ~Loud noise. Sonic boom glass failure
Typical pressure for glass failure
95% probability if noserious damage
Large and small windows usually shattered
Minor damage on house structures
Partial demolition ofhouses, made uninhabitahte
Steel frame ofclad building slightly distorted
Non-reinforced concrete or cinder walls shattered
Lower limit of serious structural damage
Steel frame building distorted and pulled from foundation
Rupture ofoil storage tank
Wooden utility poles snapped
Nearly complete destruction ofhouses
Loaded train wagons overturned
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
Probable total destruction of buildings
Limit ofcrater lip
Table 3.1; Damage produced by overpressure (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990).
3.2.3 BLEVE Thermal Radiation Effect
The thermal radiation generated from aBLEVE fireball is estimated using asolid
flame model that assumes that the fireball is aspherical ball that rises into the air as
the flammable material is burned.
The time dependent diameter and height of the fireball and the duration of the fireball
are estimated using empirical relationships. The duration of combustion, (td) for the
BLEVE fireball may be estimated from the following (Martinsen and Marx, 1999):
td = 0.9Mf %ift (10)
where td is in second and Mft is the mass of released flammable material in the fireball
in kg.
The fireball diameter is time dependent. Based on experimental observation, the
fireball tends to reach its maximum diameter during the first third of the fireball
duration. At this point, the fireball tends to rise into the air and the diameter remains
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constant until the fireball dissipates. Martinsen and Marx (1999), present the
following equation for estimating the fireball diameter during the growth phase:
D(t) =8.664 Mfb,/4t1/3 for0<t<l/3td (11)
Where D(t) is inmeter, Mft is inkg, and t is insecond.
At the end of the growth period, the fireball is assumed to achieve its maximum
diameter (Dmax) as given by following equation (Roberts, 1982):
1/3Dmax= 5.8 Ma,1/J for 1/3 td < t < td (12)
where Dmax is in meter.
The initial ground flash radius (RflaSh) associated with a BLEVE fireball is
approximated using the following relationship (CCPS, 1999):
Rfiash = 0.65Dmax (13)
where Rfiash is in meter.
The radius represents the distance that may be engulfed in flames during the initial
development ofthe BLEVE fireball.
The height of the center of the fireball is also time dependent. Based on experiment
observations (Martinsen and Marx, 1999), the center ofthe fireball rises at a constant
rate from its lift-off position to three times the lift-off position during the last two -
thirds ofthe fireball duration. This leads to the following equations for the height of
the center of the fireball (Ha):
Hft=D(t)/2 for0<t<l/3td (14)
The thermal radiation emitted from the surface ofthe fireball is also time dependent.
The fireball surface emitted flux is assumed to be constant during the growth period;
and then is assumed to linearly decrease from its maximum value to zero during the
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last two-thirds of the fireball duration. The maximum surface emitted thermal flux
(Emax) during the growth phase is given by the following (Martinsen andMarx, 1999):
Emax-0.0133 f Hc MfbI/12for 0<t<l/3td (15)
Where Emax is in kW/m2, f is the radiant heat fraction, Hc is the netheat of combustion
of the flammable material in kJ/kg and Mft is in kg.
The radiant heat fraction (f) is givenby the following (Roberts, 1982):
f=0.27PB0-32 (16)
where f is dimensionless and PB is the burst pressure of the vessel in MPa.
Fire research suggests that the maximum surface emitted flux, Emax will not exceed
some upper limit ragging from 300 to 450 kW/m2. Avalue of450 kW/m2 is suggested
as a limiting value (Martinsen and Marx, 1999). Therefore, the lesser of the surface
emitted flux given by the equation (1) should be used. During the last two -thirds of
the fireball duration, the surfaceemittedflux (Es) is givenby the following:
Es (t) = Emax [1.5 (1-t/td)] for l/3td< t < td (17)
The thermal flux incident upon a target object is a function of geometric view factor
between the fireball and the target. The most conservative approach assumes that the
target area isnormal to the surface ofthe fireball asthe fireball rises into the air.
Fora target at ground level, the maximum geometric factor (F) for a spherical emitter
is given by the following equation (CCPS, AIChE, 1994):
F(x,t) = [X* ((Dmax/2)A2)]/[ (xA2 + HA2)A1.5 ] (18)
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Figure 3.3: Assumed Orientation ofa Ground level Target to the Fireball
Surface (CCPS, AIChE, 2000)
The atmospheric trasnmissivity (x) between the fireball and the target is estimated
from the following equation (CCPS, AIChE, 1999):
x(x,t) =2.02 [RPv (V(HFB (t)2 +x2) - D(t)/2)]-009 (19)
where %is dimensionless, R is the fractional relative humidity (e.g., for 70% relative
humidity, R is 0.7), and Pv is the saturated vapor pressure of water at the ambient
temperature inPa. the thermal flux (Ith) at a target is given by the following equation
(CCPS,1999):
Ith(x,t)= x(x,t)*F(x,t)*Es(t) (20)
Where Ith is in kW/m2
Personal injuries resulting from theexposure to a BLEVE fireball are dependent upon
the thermal dose (Idose) or integral of the thermal flux over the duration ofthe fireball.
Idose(x)-doJlth(x,t)dt (21)
Where We is in kj/m .
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Table 3.2 (Prugh 1994) summarizes the type of injury that may result from various
thermal dose level.
Injury Description Thermal Dose (kJ/m )
Third-degree burns ( 99% fatal) 1200
Third-degree burns ( 50% fatal) 500
Third-degree burns (1% fatal) 250
Second-degree burns (Blisters) 150
First-degree burns (sunburns) 100
Threshold of pain 40
Table 3.2: Thermal Dose Injury Criteria (Prugh, 1994)
3.2.4 BLEVE Missile Projectile Effect
BLEVE events often generate large vessel fragments that may be propelled long
distances. In fact, in many cases, the longest reaching hazard associated with BLEVE
events is projectiles or rocket-type fragments. The fragments associated with BLEVE
generally not evenly distributed. The vessel's axial direction usually receives more
fragments than the side directions, but it isnot unusual for a vessel to pivot or spin during
the failure. Therefore, fragments can be launched in any direction. The trajectory of the
propelled fragment can also bebouncing offterrain or structure.
According to Birk (1995), as a crude approximation, projectile ranges can be related to
the fireball radius. The following is suggested as a guide:
a) 80 to 90 %ofrocketing fragments fall within 4 times the fireball radius
b) Severe rocketing fragments may travel upto 15 times the fireball radius




In this research, there are four major parts has being studied. The BLEVE limitation is
where the limit of BLEVE event is set. According to the definition, BLEVE is different
from other explosion such as Vapor Cloud Explosion and so on. The event only cancall
as a BLEVE is when a vessel or storage tank exposed to external fire and when the
temperature at current condition of the vessel is greater than the superheat temperature
limit of the material.
Blast effect is one of the hazardous effect can caused by BLEVE. In this effect the
important parameter that needs to take into consideration is the overpressure for the
explosion. The damage produce by overpressure is summarized in Table 3.1. The second
effect from BLEVE event is thermal radiation. In the BLEVE event, the fireball will be
occurred. The thermal radiation will effect in certain radius from the source of the
fireball. Figure 3.2 showed the assumed orientation of ground level target to the fireball
(CCPS, AIChE, 2000).
The third effect is the missile projectile. In this effect, a lot of assumption has being
made. The trajectory of the missile is calculated in two dimensions accounting for
resistance of air proportional to the square of its velocity. This applies to the so-called
ballistic range which lies between very low velocities, where resistance is proportional to
velocity, and supersonic velocities where resistance is a complex function. Fragments
from vessel bursts are usually encountered in this range.
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CHAPTER 4
























Figure 4.1: Methodology ofproject
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4.2 Case Study
In this project, a process in established LNG plantwas utilized as one of the case study.
This case study was simulated by using process simulator, HYSYS. In this project,
HYSYS simulator acted as "live" thermodynamic database. Based on the case study
(steady state) simulation, the needed composition and properties of the process can be
obtained and then extracted to Microsoft Excel for effect estimation.
4.3 Overheated Vessel
The objective of this project is to study the BLEVE effects. Before BLEVE took place,
the vessel need to be overheated. In other words, the vessel containing a liquid at a
temperature significantly above itsboiling point at normal atmospheric pressure.
4.4 Range of BLEVE limit
There is a limitation for BLEVE to take place. According to Reid (1980), BLEVE
limitation canbe estimated by using the superheat temperature limit, (TS|). The superheat
temperature limit is the limit to which compound may be heated before spontaneous
nucleation occurs, giving a vapor explosion. If the temperature at current condition of the
vessel is greater than the superheat temperature limit of the material, the BLEVE will
happen.
4.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVE)
The BLEVE will occur when the temperature at current condition of the vessel exceed
the superheat temperature limit. If the temperature at current condition did not exceed the
BLEVElimitation, the process design stagecan be continued.
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4.6 Mathematical Calculation in Microsoft Excel
Mathematical calculations were carried out under Microsoft Excel platform in estimating
the BLEVE effects such as blast, thermal radiation and missile projectile.
In TNT equivalent method, explosion energy of the vessel or storage tank was
determined based on the composition of the gas/liquid mixture and their heat of
combustion. Then, scaled distance, Z at specific radius was calculated. Lastly BLEVE
blast effect was estimated based on establish effects and overpressure relationship.
Four parameter used todetermine a fireball's thermal radiation hazard are the mass ofthe
fuel involved and the fireball's diameter, duration and thermal emissive power
(AIChE,1994). The radiation hazards are then calculated using empirical relation.
4.7 Summarizing All the Effects
The result of the effects were summarized and justified. This is important to the user so
that, theresult of theeffects canbe evaluated and understood.
4.8 Reconsider Process Design
After all the effects were summarized and justified, the user need to reconsider the
process design inorder to make sure the BLEVE will not take place. This can be done by
changing the process parameter such the temperature, pressure and so on.
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CHAPTERS
5.0 RESULT AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Case Study
The Figure 3.1 was utilized as case study in this project. Nevertheless, HYSYS
simulation case that was illustrated as figure 3.1 is complicated. Hence, a simplified



















Figure 5.1: Simulation of Stabilizer C-2502
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In this case study, some assumption need to be made before we can proceed to the
calculation ofBLEVE effects estimation. In the Stabilizer C-2502, it contain high amount
ofpropane compared to other component such as methane, ethane, butane and pentane. In
this case study we consider only propane due to its high volume/amount in the Stabilizer
C-2502.
A10, 000 gallon vessel is assumed to fail at an internal pressure of 1.21 time of the set
point of safety relief valve, 121 psi. The saturation temperature of propane at 121 psi is
333.55 K. This defines the initial for calculation of the change in internal energy. The
final conditions of the propane are atmospheric pressure (14.7 psi) and the normal boiling
point of propane is 266 K. Table 5.1 summarizes the thermodynamic data propane at















1 (initial) 333.55 121.00 300.00 409.20 0.038 0.311 1.153 1.337
2 (final) 266.00 14.700 181.20 365.10 0.028 6.696 0.925 1.367
Table 5.1 Thermodynamic Data for Propane Case Study (Perry Chemical Engineers'
Handbook 1998)
5.2 BLEVE Limitation
























Superheat limit temp. 330.971 K
BLEVE Yes
Table 5.2: BLEVE Limitation Data and Calculation
All initial data from the case study is summarized and calculated in the Table 5.2. The
critical temperature for propane is 369.8 K. By using equation 1, the superheat limit
temperature for propane is 330.971 K.
5.2.2 BLEVE Limitation Discussion
In this case study the temperature of the propane is about 333.55 K, which is exceeding
the superheat limit temperature. When this condition happened, the BLEVE will occur. If
the BLEVE is possible tooccur, the users need to proceed to the effects estimation which
is blast and thermal radiation effect.
5.3 BLEVE Blast Effect
5.3.1 BLEVE Blast Effect Calculation
The blast wave associated with a BLEVE event is estimated by calculating the total work
done by superheated liquid as it expands from its initial condition at the time of vessel
failure to atmospheric condition. The change in internal energy and total work done by
the explosionis calculated by using equation4.
The total work done is converted to the mass of TNT. The overpressure can be estimated
using anequivalent mass ofTNT (mrNT) and using the distance (r), from the ground zero
point of the explosion. It canbe determine by using equation 9.
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Change in internal energy
Delta U
-9.21EX105 Btu
Work 9.21 x 103 Btu
9.71 x 108 joule
2.32x10' cal
Table 5.3: Change inInternal Energy and Work Done by the Explosion
TNT Equivalent
TNT equivalent 2.07 xlO2 gTNT
Mass TNT, (Mtnt) 2.07 xlO"1 kg TNT
Radius, r 10 m
Scaling parameters,(Ze) 1.68 xlO1 m/kg1/J
Table 5.4: Scaling and Explosion Parameter
The value of the overpressure in this case study can be determined from the graph in
Figure 2.1. The effect for the overpressure also can be determined from Table 2.2. In this
case study, explosion parameter were determined through the specified radius which are
10m,20m,30m,40m,50m.
5.3.2 BLEVE Blast Effect Discussion
The overpressure and the effect of explosion with respect to the explosion parameter are
summarized in the Table 5.5. In this case study, the overpressure at radius 10 meter is
0.87 psi. At this overpressure rate, it is a partial demolition of houses, made
uninhabitable.
From the data from Table 5.5, a graph of the relationship of overpressure versus radius is
plotted. Fromthe graph the trends can be observed more clearly.
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Radius (meter) Overpressure (psi) Damage
10 0.87 Partial demolition ofhouses, made
uninhabitable
20 0.34 Large and small windows usually shattered
30 0.22 95% probability if no serious damage
40 0.15 Typical pressure for glass failure
50 0.1 Typical pressure for glass failure
Table 5.5: The Overpressure andDamage With Respect to the Explosion Parameter.
Graph OverPressure,Psi versus Radius,m
Radius (meter)
Figure 5.2: Graph Overpressure, Psi versus Radius, mfor BLEVE Explosion
Figure 5.2 showed the relationship ofoverpressure versus radius. The radius is measured
from the ground zero point of the explosion. The trends showed that overpressure
dramatically decrease with the increasing of radius. Then until certain stage, the rate of
decreasing becomes slower. This type of relationship was proven to be correct referred to
Figure 3.2. (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990)
In this Final Year Project, the result from this model is compared to the result from
SAFETI Software. The SAFETI Software has being established for many years and well










Graph OverPressure,Psi versus Radius,m
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Figure 5.3: Graph BLEVE Overpressure versus Distance Downwind. (SAFETI Software)
Figure 5.3 showed the relationship of overpressure versus distance from the SAFETI
Software. The trends showed that overpressure dramatically decrease with the increasing
of distance. This trend is similar with the trends of the Figure 5.2 (result from BLEVE
model). Although the value is not the same from both model, but the graph from the
BLEVE model still achieve the right trend.
There are some factors that SAFETI Software takes into its calculation of blast effect
which the BLEVE model did not consider. The factors are weather condition, wind
condition, mass correction factor and so on. The line show that the effect is being
considered in the windy condition was the velocity of the wind 1.5 m/s. All of these
factors will contribute to the different in value of radiation level compared to the result
from BLEVE model/tool.
In TNT Equivalent Method (J.M. Santamaria Ramiro, 1998), it was justified that the
explosion efficiency depends on the method for determining the contributing mass of
fuel. Models based on total quantity released have lower efficiencies. Meanwhile models
based on the dispersed cloud mass have higher efficiencies. Nevertheless, in this method,
it only utilized a constant efficiencies factors which between 1% and 10% for most
explosion. Hence, the application of explosion efficiency represents one of major
problems withthe TNT Equivalent Method.
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5.4 BLEVE Thermal Radiation Effect
5.4.1 BLEVE Thermal Radiation Calculation
Four main parameters used to determine a fireball's thermal radiation hazard are themass
of fuel involved, the fireball's diameter, duration and thermal emissive power (AIChE,
1994). Inthis thermal radiation effect, thermal dose isbeing considered. Below istable of
the important values in thermal radiation calculation.
Data Value Units
Mass release flammable material. (Mfb) 21276.450 kg
Duration of combustion,(td) 10.870 seconds
Maximum Diameter, (Dmax) 155.466 meter
Heightof the center fireball, (Hfb) 80.014 meter
Distance, (x): > (Dmax/2) 80 meter
Thermal Flux,(Ith) 66.347 kW/nr2
Thermal Dose,(Idose) 721.171 kJ/m2
Table 5.6: Result for BLEVE Thermal Radiation Effect Calculation.
The time duration of the combustion is calculated by using equation 10. In this case study
the time take is only 11 seconds. The effect for the thermal dose can be determined from
Table 3.2. In this case study, explosion parameter were determined through the specified
distance which are 80m, 90m, 100m, 110m, 120m.
5.4.2 BLEVE Thermal Radiation Discussion
The thermal dose and the effect of radiation with respect to the radiation parameter are
summarized in the Table 5.7. In this case study, the thermal radiation at radius 80 meter
is 721.171 kJ/m2. At this radiation rate, it causes a third degree burn, in other words 99%
fatality.
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Distance, L(meter) Thermal Dose (kJfm1) Injury Description
80 721.171 Third-degree burns ( 99% fatal )
90 661.7 Third-degree burns ( 99% fatal)
100 602.25 Third-degree burns (99% fatal)
110 545.702 Third-degree burns ( 50% fatal )
120 439.476 Third-degree burns (50% fatal)
Table 5.7: TheThermal DoseRadiation andInjury Description with Respect to the
Radiation Parameter
From the data from Table 5.7, a graph of the relationship of thermal dose radiation versus













Thermal Dose,kJ/m2 versus Distance,m
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Distance,!, (meter)
Figure 5.4: Graph Thermal Dose Radiation versus Distance Radiation
Figure 5.4 showed the relationship ofthermal dose radiation versus distance ofradiation.
The distance is measure from the point at the ground directly beneath the center of the
fireball to the receptor at the ground level as shown inFigure 3.3. The trends showed that
thermal dose radiation decrease with the increasing of distance of radiation. AIChE
(1994) suggest using an emissive power of 350 kJ/m2 for large scale release of
hydrocarbon fuel, with the power increasing as the scale ofrelease decrease. This type of
relationship was proven to be correct referred above statement.
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This graph is compared to the graph which obtained from SAFETI Software by using
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Figure 5.5: Graph Radiation Level versus Distance Downwind. (SAFETI Software)
Figure 5.5 showed the relationship of radiation level versus distance from the SAFETI
Software. The trends showedthat radiation level decrease with the increasingof distance.
This trend is similar with the trends of the Figure 5.4 (result from BLEVE model).
Although the value is not the same from both model, but the graph from BLEVE model
still achieve the right trend.
In the thermal radiation calculation, SAFETI Software has considered the angle of the
explosion, the frequency of accident to happen, the shape of vessel, weather and wind
condition and ect. The line show that the effect is being considered in the windy
condition was the velocity of the wind 1.5 m/s. All of these factors will contribute to the
different in value of radiation level compared to the result from BLEVE model/tool.
The problem with a fireball typical ofa BLEVE is that the radiation will depend on the
actual distribution of flame temperature, the composition of the gases in vicinity of the
fireball (including reactants and products), the geometry ofthe fireball, absorption ofthe
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radiation bythe fireball itselfand the geometry relationship of thereceiver withrespect to
the fireball. All these parameters are difficult to quantifyfor a BLEVE.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The BLEVE limitation is where the limit of BLEVE event is set. According to the
definition, BLEVE is different from other explosion such as Vapor CloudExplosion and
so on. The event only can call as a BLEVE is when a vessel or storage tank exposed to
external fire and when the temperature at current condition of the vessel is greater than
the superheat temperature limitof the material.
BLEVE blast effect is estimated by determine the total of work done by the explosion
and converted to the mass of TNT. The scaling law and the correlations of Figure 2.1 to
estimate the overpressure and to estimate the damage is on Table 2.2. In blast effect
estimation, the trend of the graph overpressure versus radius showed that overpressure
dramatically decrease with the increasing of radius. Then until certain stage, the rate of
decreasing becomes slower. This type ofrelationship was proven to becorrect referred to
Figure3.2. (JosephF. Louvar, 1990)
In thermal radiation method, there are 4 important parameters that need to take into
consideration. The parameters are the mass of fuel involved, the fireball's diameter,
duration and thermal emissive power (AIChE, 1994). The result of the thermal radiation
can be observed via Figure 5.4. The trend of the graph of thermal dose radiation versus
distance of radiationis provedby the statement in AIChE, 1994.
All of these results are compared to the established safety software, SAFETI. Although
the value which obtained from the SAFETI Software is not exactly the same, but the
trend of both graph is similar with ourBLEVE tools. This is because, SAFETI consider a
lotof factor such as angle of explosion, weather, wind condition, the shape of vessel, the
frequency of accident to happen in estimating the effect of BLEVE. All of these factors





As conclusion, the main objectives were accomplished. The desired data from HYSYS is
extracted to ME interface to performs the calculation and effect estimation. BLEVE
limitation was estimated using the superheat limit temperature. The blast effect was
estimated by using the TNT equivalent method and for the thermal radiation effect
estimation the thermal dose method was used. All of the effects and limitation was
summarized and justified.
This project has great potential in becoming a commercial tool in the future, for
considering the loss and prevention aspect during the conceptual design stage. Hence, it




7.0 PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Problems Encountered
A few problems were encountered during the progress of the project. The thermal
radiation effect and BLEVE limitation can not be carried out initially because there are
not many references of the thermal radiation effect and BLEVE limitation. The way of
approached is little bit different instead using the BLEVE limitation, the lower and upper
explosion limit is always being used. Hence, more literature reviews were carried out in
finding the latest method to approach the BLEVE limitation and thermal radiation effects.
For the missile projectile effect, the effect can not be carried out in this research due to
some limitation such as the literature review and so on. In this research there are only
some assumptions to estimate this effect.
The calculation of these risks and consequences measuring method will no be too user
friendly for those who just came across it. Thus, a ME interface was created in the
simplest way to display he result ofthe project in a more user friendly interface without
showing the complicated background programs.
7.2 Recommendations
Further development of this project is recommended due to the commercial potential that
is embedded in it. This is due to the fact that this type of loss prevention tool currently is
not available with any of the chemical simulators such as Aspen, PR02, and HYSYS.
Beside that, this tool can be improve more in the effect estimation by considering other
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factors such as weather, wind condition, the angle of explosion, geometry of the fireball,
adsorption ofthe radiation by the fireball itself, the geometry relationship ofthe receiver
with respect to the fireball and so on. By considering all these factors, the tool accuracy
will behigher .The present of this tool provide the essential BLEVE effects estimation at
the earlier stage of the plant conceptual design. It also allows process engineers consider
the loss and prevention aspect at the earlier stage of plant design. For example, location
consideration of pipeline and pressurized equipment after determining the effects of
explosion.
In this Final Year Project, only BLEVE was considered in the calculation. Thus, a lot
further development can be done based on this project. Firstly it can be integrated with
ME and Visual Basic, which is canalso include the entire desired database in conducting
all the necessary calculation in estimating the effects of explosions. The explosion also
not only limited to BLEVE, but also UVCE, confined VCE and so on.
Beside, other new interface can be developed which will acts as medium to return the
optimum range or safety range of material composition or any desire property of the
stream to HYSYS that willprevent the BLEVE from occurring.
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Figure B.l Correlation between overpressure and scaled distance SI
units (JosephF. Louvar, 1990).
Table B.l: Thermal Dose Injury Criteria (Prugh, 1994)
Injury Description
Third-degree burns ( 99% fatal)
Third-degree burns ( 50% fatal)













Large glass windowswhich are already under strain broken0.03






Typical pressure for glass failure
95% probability if no serious damage
Large and small windows usually shattered
Minor damage on house structures
Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
1.3
2.0 to 3.0
Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted








Lower limit of serious structural damage
Steel frame building distorted and pulled from foundation
Rupture of oil storage tank
Wooden utility poles snapped
Nearly complete destruction of houses
Loaded train wagons overturned
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
10.0 Probable total destruction of buildings
300.0 Limit of crater lip
Table B.2: Damage produced by overpressure (Joseph F. Louvar, 1990).
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Source: American Institute of Chemical Engineer, 2000
Figure D.2: The Sachs Scale Side-On Overpressure and Positive Phase Duration are




















































































































































































































Detail Description of Case Study, Stabilizer C-2502
The Stabilizer is a reboiled or refluxed column with vapor top product with 40 actual
trays. The Stabilizer produces mainly two streams: a combined ethane/propane/butane
overheated vapor stream and a pentane and heavier bottoms stream.
The overheated vapor stream form C-2505 flows to the Stabilizer Overheated Condenser,
E-2508, where it is partially condensed using Cooling water. The two phase stream from
E-2508 (flows to the Stabilizer Overheated Accumulator, V-2503, where the vapor and
liquid are separated).
The liquid phase is pumped out of the accumulator by the stabilizer reflux pump, P-2505,
and is returned to C-2502 as reflux. Liquid in excess ofthe reflux requirement ofC-2502
is pumped into vapor stream from the accumulator, V-2503, up stream of the LPG
condenser, E- 2510. The vapor phase from the accumulator flows into E-2510, where it is
totally condensed using LP propane.
The pressure in C-2502 is normally maintained at about 6.5 barg by controlling the vapor
stream out of V-2503 to the LPG condenser. P-2505A/B is protected by the minimum
flow controlsystem.
The liquid in the bottom of C-2502 flows to the Stabilizer Reboiler, E-2507, where it is
partially vaporized by LLP steam. The mix streams in returned to the column under the
bottom tray. The vapor passes back up the column stripping the lighter components from
the liquid flowing down out the gasoline product cooler, E-2509, where it is cooled and
sentto BCOT via gasoline metering in Unit 3200.
Source: Established LNG Plant in Malaysia
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